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Abstract;
This paper presents an elaboration on Al-Ghazali’s intellectual and 
spiritual struggle in searching for certitude to establish secure basis 
for his theory of knowledge. The elaboration starts with introducing 
Al-Ghazali’s definition and classification of knowledge, discussing 
the important of both sacred and profane knowledge as he 
categorizes of them into personal and collective obligations, and 
develop into presenting his schema of knowledge. Further discussion 
then focuses on essential staging in his intellectual and spiritual 
inquiry to reach the final stage of a personal testimony of doubtless 
true knowledge. Initiated with a total denial of knowledge to abolish 
uncertainty to its fullest extent, his struggle then proceeded to the 
level of extreme skepticism proceeding establishment of his 
fundamental theory of knowledge.
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I.  IntroductionI
t needs simply a glance at al- Ghazali’s career to see that the issue of knowledge 
was of the utmost concern to his intellectual and spiritual life. The fact that he 
had to experience a period of crisis, struggling to establish a secure basis for his 
theory of knowledge, shows how seriously he regarded the problem (far more 
so, in fact, than any other Muslim scholar who has written on epistemology). 
This says a great deal, given the importance of the issue to the development of 
Islamic thought.
Although al-Ghazali was not alone “in searching for experiential certainty 
in inner knowledge” as other Muslim thinkers such as al-Suhrawardi, Ibn Sina, 
and Abu al-Barakat also essentially deal with this theme of “self-awareness and 
its implications,” the drama into which it brought on his life makes his quest 
exceptional. For al-Ghazali, the issue of knowledge is inseparable from the issue 
of belief in God. This clearly shows in his artful and sometimes persuasive 
writing on the deeper aspects of the issue. For the current purpose, however, 
our elaboration will focus mainly on his accounts on definitions and 
II. Knowledge: Definitions and Classifications  
Al-Ghazali’s principal definitions of knowledge as classified by F. 
Rosenthal fall into  at least four categories:
1. Knowledge as the “process of knowing,” which is “identical with knower 
and the known,” a notion that al- Ghazali expresses in such statements as: “ 
Knowledge is the through which one knows” or “Knowledge is that through 
which the essence is knowing”
2. Knowledge as cognition or as he simply defines it: “knowledge is cognition”
3. Knowledge is faith, for he writes: “knowledge is the perception (tasawwur) 
of things through thorough understanding (tahaqquq) of  quiddity and 
definition and apperception (tasdiq) with regard to them through pure, 
verified (muhaqqaq) certainity.”
4. Knowledge as “remembrance” and “imagination” or as “an image, a vision, 
an opinion “which he demonstrates in such assertion as: “knowledge is an 
image that conforms to the object known, like a picture (surah) or sculpture 
(naqsh), which is the image of the thing.”
In addition to his various definition of knowledge, al-Ghazali delineates 
as well some divisions of knowledge. In his “Book of knowledge“ in the Ihya, he 
opens the issue by distinguishing knowledge, from the point of view of what 
man is obliged to know,  into knowledge, or science, of individual obligation 
(fard ayn) and that of collective obligation (fard kifayah).  These two categories of 
knowledge may be further subdivided as well. Under the heading of individual 
obligation, and in harmony with legal or technical concepts, al-Ghazali includes 
knowledge of the foundations of Islam and other fundamental religious 
practices such as beliefs, works, and prohibition.  Further of explanation of 
various individual condition related to the issue is presented as well using a 
very legal vocabulary. The obligations and prohibitions, according to al-Ghazali, 
will be different for individuals based on whether they may be classified as 
adult or minor, sane or insane, sound of body or suffering from certain physical 
disabilities such as blindness, deafness, or the like. He also state that this 
knowledge of personal obligation is necessary only when the time for a 
particular obligation is at hand. For example, knowledge of fasting is necessary 
when midday arrives..
Al-Ghazali also particularly mentions the knowledge of “beliefs and 
actions of the heart” as part of the knowledge of individual obligation. 
However, as with aforementioned, this type of knowledge is also accompanied 
by certain conditions. He explains that if a person experiences some doubt 
concerning his faith, either naturally or due to some outside influences, he is 
obliged to seek knowledge which can dispel this doubt
As for the knowledge of collective obligations, al-Ghazali first devides 
the subject into “sacred ”(shr’iya) and “profane” (ghayr shar’iya) sciences. 
M o re o v e r, t h e s e t w o d i v i s i o n s a re f u r t h e r s u b d i v i d e d i n t o 
“praiseworthy”(mahmud )and “blameworthy” (madhmum ) , and “ 
permissive” (mubah). All the sacred sciences, understood to have been acquired 
from the Prophet, are considered praiseworthy. In further discussion however, 
al-Ghazali  warns people not to be distracted by sciences which might appear 
praiseworthy.
For the profane or the secular sciences, he classifies some branches as 
being praiseworthy “are those whose knowledge the activities of this life 
depend such as medicine or arithmetic, “science medicine” is necessary for the 
life of the body” while arithmetic is necessary for “daily transaction and 
division of legacies and heritance.” The blameworthy sciences he defines as 
magic, talismanic science, juggling, or trickery. 
Some branches of philosophy, since philosophy itself does not stand 
alone as a single branch of knowledge, are classified differently according ton 
their function and involvement, Arithmetic, for instance,, is considered 
permissible or even praiseworthy when it is related to the necessities of the 
daily life, as mentioned before. Nevertheless, al-Ghazali again warns people 
against this science which may lead them into blameworthy acts because of the 
innovations which are routine practice in this field. 
The tendency of classifying knowledge was not a new trend in al-
Ghazali’s era for it often appeared in the views of earlier Muslim thinkers. Like 
other traditional philosophers, Abu Ali al-Husain Ibn Sina (d.429/1037), for 
instance, shows deep consideration for the classification of sciences 
corresponding to his view of a “hierarchy of knowledge.” Based on this ground 
of thought, Ibn Sina even made efforts to integrate different types of sciences 
and ways of attaining knowledge into his extensive formulation. At this point, 
Ibn Sina shows an open possibility of various methods regarding his 
epistemological concept, as Sayyed Hosein Nasr recalls: “he used not on but 
many methods to gain knowledge, ranging from intellectual intuition and 
illumination to ratiocination, observation, and even experimentation.”
The same trend can even be seen in the field of Mysticism. For example, 
al-Qusyairi (d. 465/1073) categorized sciences into three branches: the science of 
the philosophers, thinkers or sages, (arbab al-‘Uqul), the science of religious 
scholars, and the science of the mystics (arbab al-ma’arif). Together with this, he 
asserts a parallel classification for these three branches of science. He classifies 
the first branch as the science of certitude (‘ilm al-yaqin), the second as the 
essence of certitude (‘ayn al-yaqin), and the third as the truth of certitude (haqq 
al-yaqin).
A classification of knowledge which implies a somewhat similar 
hierarchy to Qusyairi’s arrangement can also be found in the schematic view of 
al-Ghazali’s division of knowledge, as presented by Lazarus Yafeh:
Knowledge (al-‘ilm):
Intellectual knowledge                          Religious 
    (‘Ulum ‘aqliyah)                           (‘Ulum shar’iya diniyah)
 Necessary knowledge:                       Acquired knowledge
     (‘Ulum daruriyah)                              (‘Ulum muktasaba)
                           Worldly knowledge Heavenly knowledge
                             (‘Ulum dunyawiyah) (‘Ulum Ukhrawiyah)
 
             Knowledge of the heart                           Knowledge of God 
(‘Ilum ahwal al-hal)                            the Most High, 
                                                     Of His Attribute 
  and His Works
                                                                    (‘Ilm al-mukasyafa)
He asserts these divisions in both the Ihya’ and the Munqidh, which 
means that he maintained, if not established, the theory upon finding certitude 
after passing through his spiritual crisis. We will therefore refer to this scheme, 
due to its clarity and simplicity, in our further discussion of al-Ghazali’s 
epistemology.
III. Denial of all knowledge
What prompted al-Ghazali’s questioning of the reliability of his personal 
knowledge in particular and of his theory of knowledge in general was his 
adoption of the Neoplatonic notion that true knowledge is supposed to be 
completely trustworthy, that is, fre from any possibility of doubt. To attain such 
degree of knowledge, the basis or the sources of knowledge being sought must 
consequently be solid and proven reliable. This recognition made him realize 
the inherent weakness of the sources of his knowledge. He writes:
It was plain to me that sure and certain knowledge is that knowledge in 
which the object is disclosed in such a fashion that no doubt remains along 
with it, that no possibility of error or illusion accompanies it, and that the 
mind cannot even entertain such a supposition. Certain knowledge must 
also be infallible; and this infallibility or security from error is such that no 
attempt is made by someone who turns stones into gold or a rod into a 
serpent… Thereupon I investigated the various kinds of knowledge I had, 
and found myself destitute of all knowledge with characteristic of 
infallibility…     
This realization allowed al-Ghazali to see that his own knowledge was 
derived through blind acceptance (taqlid), which then becomes the first 
approach he criticized. Even though later on he does allow or even oblige the 
application of taqlid for certain people when dealing with a higher level of 
knowledge, or more precisely the level of true vision of things divine. At this 
point the issue of taqlid is inseparable from the issue of different degrees of 
belief. Therefore, his criticism here means more to the application of the method 
in his personal case.
Al-Ghazali describes his abandonment of taqlid as “breaking the glass of 
his naïve belief,” which, once shattered, cannot be repaired by patching.” What 
must be done to restore the belief is that “the glass must be melted once again in 
the furnace for a new start, and out of it another fresh vessel formed.” 
Thereupon he begins to deny all the beliefs that he has previously held, except 
those concerning the three fundamental religious beliefs: God, Prophecy, and 
the Last Judgment, which are too deeply rooted in him to be shaken altogether.” 
Other than these, the only beliefs that he retained were those of sense 
perception and necessary or a priory truths, which tell us that “ten is more than 
three,” that a thing cannot both exist and not exist at the same time, nor be 
”necessary and impossible simultaneously.”
However, his preservation of self-evident knowledge did not free him 
from suspecting its reliability. After observation he realized how sense 
perception is just well unreliable and even deceitful. An ordinary example is the 
misleading nature of sight, for it is a property of the naked eye to see things 
smaller at a distance or to be unable to detect motion at extremely fast speeds. 
This fact not only shook but also destroyed his confidence in sense 
perception. Furthermore, once he found he could no longer rely on sense 
perception, he began to scrutinize the reliability of necessary truth as well. By 
comparing this case to that of dreams, which are believed to be reality while 
one is asleep but which then vanish as soon as the person wakes up, he 
suggests that there might be another reality behind this reality of awakening. 
He writes, “The fact that such a supra-natural apprehension has not manifested 
itself is no proof that it is impossible.”    
This loss of reliance on self-evident knowledge shook al-Ghazali’s mental 
state so severely that it affected his physical condition as well. It was at this 
point that he entered the phase of skepticism, where he underwent a period of 
both intellectual and physical crisis which lasted for about months.
During this period he found himself helpless, for it seemed That there 
was no way of ever regaining certainty about anything because his trust in the 
God cured the “malady” that he could regain confidence in believing in the 
necessary truth again. He says, “this did not come about by systematic or 
marshaled argument, but by a light which God most high cast into my breast.”
In the later positions of his autobiography al-Ghazali even admits that 
his faith was restored on the basis of certain other sources of knowledge he had 
previously denied. This is pointe out by E.L. Ormsby who sees in al-Ghazali’s 
account of this process a construction of “artful correspondences.” He writes:
… dreams misled, but later are seen co contain prophetic knowledge; the 
intellect could err, but later discovers its proper unerring function in the 
provision of demonstration. The senses transfigured by the truth stand 
revealed as the most trustworthy instruments of perception. The fact that 
nothing is what it seems to be inspired panic and confusion in his 
skeptical state, but in his converted state, this same fact stands as a 
guarantor of the possibility of transcendent knowledge.   
A point to be considered here is that the main theme of this denial 
together with the crisis and its cure, constitutes the primary discussion in the 
central issue of epistemology. His bewilderment during his uncertainty and 
insecurity as to the data of sense perception was a process of setting his position 
on the issue of the nature of knowledge, which is the issue of appearance versus 
reality.” His reappreciation, albeit with certain modifications, of the 
authorization of sense perception, as well as of the intellect, and even his 
affirmation of his experience of intuitional knowledge when God shone light 
into his heart, functions as a deliberate means of building a foundation for 
reliable sources of knowledge in his concept of epistemology. This in a sense is 
“the courage to know and the courage to doubt” combined. 
A parallel procedure is adopted later by Rene Descartes (d.1650), who 
illustrates the problem as follows:
Suppose he had a basket full of apples and, being worried that some of the 
apples were rotten, want to take out the rotten ones to prevent the rot 
spreading. How would he proceed? Would he not begin by tipping the 
whole lot out of the basket? And would not the next step be to cast his eye 
over each apple in turn, and pick up and put back in the basket only those 
he saw to be sound, leaving the others?... Now the best way they can 
accomplish this is to reject all their beliefs together in one go, as if they 
were all uncertain and false. They can then go over each belief in turn and 
re-adopt only those which they recognize to be true and indubitable. Thus 
I was right to begin by rejecting all my beliefs.
IV. Skepticism
It is mentioned before that skepticism was a very important stage in the 
re-establishment of al-Ghazali’s fundamental theory of knowledge; therefore, it 
seems worthy to look at some ancient traces of this system of thought. The term 
is derived from the Greek word skepsis whish originally meant “consideration” 
or “doubt.” In the field of philosophy it was then defined as “the view that 
reason has no capacity to come to any conclusions at all, or else that reason is 
capable of nothing beyond very modest results.”
Tendencies to skeptical thinking seem to begin in the pre-Socratic era. 
Heraclitus (c. 540-475) saying that “everything is in flux and that one can’t step 
twice into the same river,” for example, was an important lead to skepticism. 
This theory was then further elaborated by Cratylus (fl. 410 B.C) into a deeper 
skeptical thought, asserting that “since everything is changing, one can’t step 
once into the same river, because both that river and oneself are changing.” A 
serious tendency of skepticism was even prompted by Xenophanus (570-c. 470 
B.C) in his proposition of questioning “the existence of any criterion of true 
knowledge,” suggesting that one will not be able to distinguish f skeptical the 
truth, if he happened to come across it, from the error.A much more serious 
form of skeptical thought was represented by Gorgias, whose assertion we will 
come across later. 
However, the figure that is recognized as the founder of the skeptical 
tradition or “the first to perfect the system and ethics of skepticism” is Phyrrho 
of Elis (c.360-270 B.C), who was as well regarded as an extreme  skeptics then 
are often called Pyrrhonist, and their system is known as Pyrrhonism. Deriving 
some portions of proposition from Protagorean relativism, Pyrrho established a 
solid ground for his assertion regarding the relativity of all perceptions and 
opinion, asserting that “if sense and reason were deceptive singly, no truth 
could be expected from the two combination. Perception does not give us things 
as they are, but as they appear in accidental relations.” Together with this he 
also states that “we must suspend all judgment, committing our selves to a non-
committal silence concerning everything.” 
In the Encyclopedia of Philisophy the term skepticism is described as “a 
critical philosophical attitude” which “questions the reliability of the 
knowledge claims made by philosophers and others,” and that “skeptics have 
organized their questioning into systematic sets of arguments aimed at raising 
doubt.” Therefore skepticism may be considered as the negative response in 
any question related to the validity of knowledge.
Questions related to the validity of knowledge include: “Is the human 
mind capable of discovering or finding any genuine knowledge?” or “when or 
under what conditions is knowledge valid?” The two opposing schools of 
thought that propose contradictory answers to the questions are skepticism, 
which negates the possibility of knowledge, and positivism, which restricts 
knowledge to “the facts of objective experience” only.
Further discussion of skepticism comprises types or degrees of 
terminology. In the field of philosophy, there are at least three possible types 
suggested. The first, favored by Aristocrates, is “the attitude of suspending 
judgment and questioning all assumptions and conclusions so that each one 
will be forced to justify itself before the bar of critical analysis.” The second, 
represented by the phenomenalism of Kant, is “the position that knowledge 
deals only with experience of phenomena, and that the mind of man is unable 
to know the source or ground of experience.” The third, proposed by the Greek 
Gorgias, asserts “that knowledge is impossible and the quest of truth is in 
vain.”
Comparing these three degrees of skepticism to al-Ghazali’s position as a 
skeptic, we can see that he can only be classed in the first or the second degree. 
It may even be that he was, as he in fact admits, naturally curious about the 
realty of everything since a very young age, which means that the nature of his 
skepticism from the beginning was a means of releasing the mind from blind 
acceptance and the like. In other words, the nature of skepticism is to propose 
intellectual criticism to prevent oneself from making an error in claiming truth.
Another factor excluding him from the third degree of skepticism is the 
reality that he never lost his faith in the three fundamental religious beliefs even 
during the period when he declares that he was suffering heavily from doubt. 
This shows that he was never so far advanced in his skepticism as to deny the 
existence of truth. His skepticism and denial genuinely relied on other truths. 
This is the type of skepticism which limits itself to “stimulating philosophical 
reflection,” to warning people against being inattentive by saying: “Don’t be too 
sure,” “You may be wrong,” or “Be tolerant and open-minded.”
This spirit of toleration of various approaches to the truth is suggested in 
his Munqidh where he pictures different remedies for different particular, 
individual maladies regardless of the fact that he chooses for himself the path of 
“immediate, living experience” of the “metaphoric al taste” as only access to the 
deepest truth. To some extent though, al-Ghazali also appears close to favoring 
Gorgias’ affirmation when he first asserts the incommunicability of the 
aforementioned taste of direct experience. 
If such is the nature of al-Ghazal’s skepticism, it an be said that in view 
of the fact that he was able to regain faith in the possibility of attaining 
knowledge, this method constituted a perfect  bridge linking a negative 
response with a positive affirmation of validity. It is, in other words, a 
persuasive strategy that leads one to his concept of truth through step by step 
experience, rather than by merely offering cogent arguments.
Certain scholars, however, question the genuineness of the nature of al-
Ghazali’s skepticism, for “there had existed along history of skeptical thoughts 
within the Islamic world.” One example related to this account is that of an 
earlier scholar, Salih Ibn Abd al-Quddus, who wrote a Book of Doubts (Kitab al-
Syuhuk) which is so persuasive that “whoever reads it, doubts concerning what 
exists until he fancies that it does not exist, and concerning what does not exist 
until he fancies that it does exist.”  
Watt’s explanation even proved that al-Ghazali’s Munqidh, presented as 
an account of his procedure in searching for certitude which started with the 
confusion of his skeptical thought, “can not be accepted as an accurate 
chronological record of events.” It is suggested that his period of skepticism 
“must have been preceded by some study of Philosophy” and its connections 
with skepticism.
V. Conclusion
The elaboration above, showing how earnestly he took the process of 
denying all uncertainty in his life and how critically the period of skepticism he 
had to go through upon deciding a long journey to certitude, says a great deal 
of his personal attitude upon the matter. To some extent this pictures what 
Corbin illustrates as that he “confronted the problem of knowledge and of 
personal certitude to its fullest extent.”  His schematic composition of the 
Munqidh represents a perfect strategy leading to his attaining certainty of true 
knowledge which he, in Corbin’s presentation, identifies as “the knowledge 
through which the known object is utterly disclosed (to the spirit), in such a 
manner that no doubt can exist with regard to it, and no error can tarnish it.” It 
is referring to this method in his autobiography that Corbin writes: “when he 
speaks about true knowledge, what he says rings with the authenticity of 
personal testimony.”  
